Journal Two

In the early twenty-first century, the scholarship on demagoguery seemed hopelessly stuck. Rather than serving as a vital field of inquiry—one that might help explain and minimize a particularly toxic variety of rhetoric—the concept of demagoguery had devolved into “a term of abuse that people apply to rhetors with whom they disagree” (Roberts-Miller 461).

Worse still, some of the existing literature seemed to indicate that all emotional appeals, even those prompting positive social change, carried the whiff of demagoguery about them (Roberts-Miller 461–462). Per this line of reasoning, there was little, aside from outcomes, to distinguish the rhetoric of, say, Martin Luther King from that of Joseph McCarthy. After all, both men used powerful emotional appeals to unify groups and drive social change. And yet, very few of us would be likely to group the legacies of these two men under one rhetorical roof, so the critical approach to the topic of demagoguery went stagnant.

And yet, there remained a pressing need to distinguish between demagoguery and bona fide pathetic appeals. Demagoguery, of course, did not go away merely because scholars had failed to adequately define it. If anything, one might argue that, in the age of the internet—where social polarities have sharpened, and digital texts circulate at the speed of light—the need to describe and control demagoguery is ever more urgent.

In the following response, I discuss and evaluate the definition that Patricia Roberts-Miller has posited as an alternative to older, less workable ways of thinking about demagoguery. I argue that although the new definition offers clear advantages, it might be more useful if it were decoupled from the notion of propaganda.

The alternative definition suggested by Roberts-Miller states that demagoguery is “polarizing propaganda that motivates members of an ingroup to hate and scapegoat some outgroup(s), largely by promising certainty, stability, and…‘an escape from freedom’” (462).

The first advantage of this new definition is its utility. Scholars who are interested in exploring demagoguery now have at their disposal a list of its relevant characteristics. These characteristics are grounded in real-world behaviors and effects that can be tested against the statements of any particular rhetor. It seems to me that the increasing prevalence of demagogic rhetoric creates an exigence that demands a practical response from scholars. This definition is tailor-made for examining rhetorical acts that one might encounter in the course of daily life—in other words, it is grounded and workable.

The second and most important advantage of Roberts-Miller’s definition is its acknowledgement that emotional, populist appeals are not inherently demagogic. Roberts-Miller’s definition accomplishes this by relying on a secondary definition of propaganda—“highly fallacious discourse” (466)—that, in turn, describes fallacies as violations of certain practical discursive rules (469–471). This is crucial, as it offers an alternative for scholars unwilling to tar all social activism with the same critical brush. Thus, it offers a workable path around the quagmire that had stalled progress in the field of demagoguery.

However, this new definition of demagoguery might benefit from the elimination of “propaganda” as one of its essential terms.  Although Roberts-Miller’s critical path is workable, I believe that it might be rather easier to walk if propaganda were explored as a separate, albeit related, species of rhetoric. I make this suggestion because the inclusion of propaganda opens the door to what Roberts-Miller herself has admitted is often “a meaningless term, simply indicating disapproval” (466). Thus, it necessitates another, secondary definition, which somewhat complicates and detracts from the definition’s use value, one of its principal assets. Therefore, the definition might be simplified and improved by stepping away from the notion of propaganda and focusing instead on the divisive effects of demagogic rhetoric.

As misleading, unethical, and manipulative appeals proliferate in the digital age, the work of labeling and minimizing such rhetoric is essential. Thankfully, the critical conversation around demagoguery is increasingly vibrant, and the work of Roberts-Miller has been key to its revival.